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[737] 
Essay 
Finding the Error in Daubert 
Mark Haug and Emily Baird 
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. laid down the 
standard for admissibility of expert testimony. We believe the best standard is simpler 
than the one chosen by the Court: The Daubert standard really is about discerning the 
trustworthiness of expert, and trustworthiness is best determined through an expert’s 
accounting of the error within his testimony. Lower courts have struggled with the 
Daubert standard. We offer evidence of the problem and propose a new standard that 
would capture the essence of Daubert but significantly simplify its application. 
 
  Ph.D., J.D., School of Business Teaching Fellow at the University of Kansas. We wish to 
thank Lauren Moreno for her suggestions and the editorial staff at Hastings Law Journal for their time 
and assistance in editing our paper. 
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Introduction 
In federal courts, expert evidence enjoys two freedoms other 
evidence does not: permissible hearsay and opinion testimony.1 
Accordingly, the rule for admissibility of expert testimony2 has a 
significant impact on litigation. Many high-stakes cases turn on “the 
battle of the experts,” engaging counsel and judges alike to apply the 
Daubert standard. We believe this standard is difficult to apply. Our 
Essay proposes a new standard that simply examines the three types of 
error that exist in the scientific endeavor. Such a bold proposal as ours, 
of course, requires a credible argument as to why current thinking is 
flawed and examining the past and present struggles with admitting 
expert opinion. 
Our proposal is consistent with Daubert’s3 motivation and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702.4 In our belief, it is also more faithful to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403,5 the Fifth,6 Seventh,7 and Ninth Amendments,8 and 
 
 1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (“Unlike an ordinary witness, 
an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand 
knowledge or observation. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand 
knowledge—a rule which represents ‘a most pervasive manifestation of the common law insistence 
upon ‘the most reliable sources of information.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 602 
advisory committee’s note) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 2. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 3. 509 U.S. 579. 
 4. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
 5. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 6. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 7. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
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promotes expedient litigation. We propose the following rule: 
If an expert can account for the measurement error, the random error, 
and the systematic error in his evidence, then he ought to be permitted 
to testify. On the other hand, if he should fail to account for any one or 
more of these three types of error, then his testimony ought not be 
admitted. 
Our rule simply asks an expert for an accounting of error in his 
evidence, which, of course, is the primary interest in adjudicating opinion 
testimony. If an expert cannot account for each of science’s three errors,9 
then it is self-evident that the expert himself is uncertain as to the degree 
of credibility that ought to be placed upon his opinion. A jurist ought to 
bar the expert from testifying, as the expert is either not an able expert 
or his testimony is no longer grounded in expert judgment but has 
crossed into speculation. If on the other hand, the expert can account for 
all three errors, then his opinion contains an objective degree of 
credibility. The expert’s opinion, accounting for all three kinds of error, 
ought to be the subject of “vigorous cross-examination,”10 because his 
opinion would provide a common and scientifically acceptable basis and 
could therefore either be rebutted based on the facts of the case, or 
challenged as an expert opinion. 
To explain our proposal, we begin with a short review of Daubert 
and its progeny.11 In our review, we consider some of the ways courts 
have managed the four nonexclusive criteria12 promulgated in Daubert 
for the purpose of assessing evidentiary reliability13 and, ultimately, 
admissibility.14 We consider data which provide a look at how these 
criteria have been implemented in the lower courts. Following this, we 
provide a taxonomy of error: an explanation and illustration of three 
types of error in science. In our conclusion, we show how our proposal 
satisfies all four criteria, is more expedient,15 and is more manageable for 
the gatekeeper.16 
 
 8. U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
 9. See infra Part III; see also Mark Haug, Minimizing Uncertainty in Scientific Evidence, in 
Scientific Evidence Review: Monograph No.7, at 87, 88–89 (Cynthia H. Cwik & Helen E. Witt eds., 
2006).  
 10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). 
 11. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(1997). 
 12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
 13. Id. at 590. 
 14. Id. at 592. 
 15. “Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve 
disputes finally and quickly.” Id. at 597.  
 16. See generally Tal Golan, Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific 
Expert Testimony in England and America (2004) (examining the past and present struggles with 
admitting expert opinion). 
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I.  DAUBERT’s Four Factors to Assess Evidentiary Reliability 
The Court in Daubert set out to determine whether the Federal 
Rules of Evidence superseded the rule for admissibility of expert opinion 
established in Frye v. United States17 seventy years earlier.18 Daubert 
alleged that Merrell Dow’s medication, Bendectin, caused birth defects.19 
Applying the Frye standard of general acceptance,20 the lower courts had 
determined that it was not generally accepted that Bendectin caused 
birth defects.21 Daubert argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
however, suggested a more expansive view of admissibility of expert 
opinion than Frye.22 The Court agreed.23 
The Court in Daubert proposed the following criteria for 
determining the admissibility of expert opinion under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence: testability,24 peer review,25 known or potential rate of error,26 
and general acceptance.27 Although much has been written concerning 
Daubert, we find no conclusive material on Daubert’s factor of “known 
or potential error rate.”28 Three possible reasons include: (1) it is difficult 
to define, but “we know it when we see it”; (2) it is merely a detail of 
“evidentiary reliability” and therefore, does not warrant such attention; 
or, (3) it is too difficult to implement. 
Whatever the reasons may be, this factor is worthy of consideration, 
at the very least, to alert the unsuspecting jurist of the perils of error 
identification and quantification. Our purpose, however, is far bolder: 
We believe that within this factor lies the crux of admitting opinion 
testimony. Whether for the minimal purpose of illuminating a mere 
factor or for the grander purpose of a new rule of admissibility, our 
 
 17. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585–87. 
 19. Id. at 582. 
 20. “General Acceptance” refers to the methods, practices, and body of knowledge generally 
accepted within the scientific discipline under consideration. See id. at 584. 
 21. Id. at 583–85 (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014). 
 22. Id. at 587–89. 
 23. Id. at 587. 
 24. Id. at 593 (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or 
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has 
been) tested.”).  
 25. Id. at 593–94 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication. . . . [S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community 
is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in 
methodology will be detected.”). 
 26. Id. at 594 (“Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily 
should consider the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation.” (citation omitted)). 
 27. Id. (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. . . . ‘[A] known 
technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community’ may properly be 
viewed with skepticism.” (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985))). 
 28. Id. at 580. 
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objective is to enable legal professionals to use sound judgment with 
respect to scientific error and thereby provide greater clarity and 
predictability to Daubert hearings. In pursuit of our objective, we 
endeavor to convince the reader that Daubert’s list of four nonexclusive 
factors,29 as well as any other factor illuminating evidentiary reliability of 
scientific evidence, may be subsumed into an able analysis of error. 
We begin with our belief that the United States Supreme Court did 
not know exactly what to do with the “known or potential rate of error” 
factor. For example, the Court provides imprecise support for its 
decision. In footnote 9, the Court supplies, in part, “the difference 
between accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is 
distinct from the other by no more than a hen’s kick.”30 Indeed, the Court 
has technically mislabeled this factor.31 Superficially, the factor is 
seemingly well designed, with a strong whiff of the “stuff” of science. The 
general acceptance factor, the peer review factor, and the testability 
factor are all qualitative judgments, while the “error” factor is seemingly 
an invitation for some quantitative—and therefore difficult—indicia. The 
“error” factor invites a number of variations laid upon the “gatekeeper,” 
such as: Must the error rate be known with exactitude (rather than 
potential)?32 Shall the error rate be held to some predetermined standard 
 
 29. Id. at 593–94. 
 30. Id. at 590 n.9 (quoting James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A 
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). As we have set out to show in this Essay, the issues of “accuracy,” “validity,” and 
“reliability” are independent topics and are quite different in their diagnosis and prognosis. 
 31. The Court’s persistence with the term “rate of error” is a hint that the Court is uncertain what 
to do with the idea of error: For all of the Court’s careful and precise thought, its use of the term 
“rate” is either grossly misplaced or contemplates something that needs further description. The term 
“rate” refers to a ratio with some quantity per unit of time. See, e.g., Regina C. Elandt-Johnson, 
Definition of Rates, 102 Am. J. Epidemiology, 267, 268 (1975). Scientific errors, however, are generally 
understood as proportions—a quantity where the numerator is contained in the denominator. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Sorto-Romero v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 05-CV-5172 (SJF) (AKT), 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71588, at *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (finding that plaintiff’s proferred engineering 
expert, who would testify that the wood-carving tool that caused injury was defective, was unreliable 
for reasons including that an error rate could not be produced); Rabozzi v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 5:03-
CV-1397 (NAM/DEP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21724, at *7, *8, *20 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (finding 
a civil engineering expert’s testimony regarding a jet boat design to be inadmissible, as none of the 
four Daubert criteria were met, including that the expert did not provide a known rate of error); 
Roane v. Greenwich Swim Comm., 330 F. Supp. 2d 306, 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that the 
proffered expert in the field of mechanical engineering was precluded from testifying, in part due to 
the inability to produce a rate of error); Nook v. Long Island R.R. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 639, 641–42 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting motion to exclude plaintiff-employee’s expert testimony from an industrial 
hygienist on the grounds that the expert did not uphold the Daubert standards and could not offer a 
known rate of error); United States v. Towns, 19 F. Supp. 2d 67, 70–72 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing but 
limiting the testimony of a clinical psychology expert regarding defendant’s mens rea and his claim of 
mental illness being the cause of his attempted bank robbery, because the proffer asserted that an 
error rate would be provided by said expert). Similarly, in Phillips v. Raymond Corp., defendants 
moved to exclude the plaintiff’s expert in the field of biomechanics. 364 F. Supp. 2d 730, 732–33 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005). The court granted the motion, finding that the expert had not reliably tested his assertions, 
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among scientists or jurists?33 Is it sufficient that the expert can calculate 
the known or potential rate of error?34 Is it sufficient that the gatekeeper 
can assess the known or potential rate of error?35 The factor invites other 
 
because the error rate was referenced as being unknown; in order to have provided an accurate error 
rate, the expert would have had to use “retrospective analysis,” which he did not do. Id. at 740–41. 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Microtek Int’l Dev. Sys. Div., Inc., No. 99-298-KI, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2771, at *2, *10–13, *15 (D. Or. Mar. 10, 2000) (excluding data from polygraph test because the 
error rate was referenced as being low in highly controlled studies, but when applied in the “real 
world,” was generally much higher, and because data showed that, on average, false negatives 
occurred 5% of the time and false positives, 10% of the time); Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F. 
Supp. 547, 556–57 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (allowing the testimony of an expert offered to provide a 
comparative test studying the engine of a Sea Doo in choppy water, but limiting the testimony to that 
of a lay person, rather than an expert, because the test performed was found to be unreliable, partially 
due to a high estimated rate of error). Another example is In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 
393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), which consolidated numerous civil actions claiming that the 
consumption of dietary supplements containing Ephedra resulted in injury or death. The defendants 
moved to exclude expert testimony presented by the plaintiffs. Id. P-values and confidence intervals 
were identified as the two ways that epidemiological studies are statistically evaluated. Id. at 191. The 
experts’ study offered that “the fivefold increased rate of hemorrhagic stroke among study participants 
who took more than 32 mg of ephedra on the day before the case’s stroke has a ‘95% confidence 
interval of 0.84 to 41.33.’” Id. The statistical significance of the study was therefore found to be 
insufficient, as that “interval includes the value 1.0 (which would mean no increased risk).” Id. The 
referenced p-value was .07, which would assume a “less than a one-in-14 chance of [an association 
between ephedra and stroke] being due to a sampling error.” Id. at 191 n.7. 
 34. See, e.g., Albert v. Jordan, Nos. 05CV516, 05CV517, 05CV518, 05CV519, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92025, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Dec. 14, 2007) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of 
an expert in the field of vocational rehabilitation, while also finding that the expert provided reliable 
information, and noting that the rate of error was known without further addressing it); Benkwith v. 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1326, 1330, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (granting defendant’s 
motion to exclude testimony of an expert in the field of epidemiology regarding a spray causing 
plaintiff’s anosmia, because the opinions had not been tested and a rate of error could not be 
provided). 
 35. For example, in Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eight Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision to allow testimony of a regression analyst commissioned by 
plaintiffs’ Native American voters in order to show that the redistricting of the legislative area caused 
a bloc in the Native American vote. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Gruender notes some 
discomfort with the testimony due to Daubert’s known or potential rate of error factor, explaining that 
it is “difficult to weigh this factor in Daubert’s analysis if ‘the effect of that error is unknown.’” Id. at 
1026 (Gruender, J., concurring) (quoting Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1002 (D.S.D. 
2004)). For other examples, see e.g., United States v. Leblanc, 45 F. App’x 393, 398, 400 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(finding evidence was inadmissible when plaintiff sought to introduce testimony of a child psychologist 
regarding the susceptibility of children to coercive interrogation in a case of sexual assault, because the 
opinion relied on “‘soft science’ . . . in which ‘error is . . . rampant’” (quoting the district court)); 
United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698–99 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (admitting expert’s testimony 
on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony in a Daubert hearing, and finding that the factor of error 
rate was not relevant as the study in question relied on the accuracy of observations made by other 
people based on the order in which photographs were placed); Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co., No. 84-3483 
(NHJ), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21318, at *16, *22–24 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1995) (finding that plaintiff’s 
teratology expert was not permitted to testify, because the methodology used was found to be 
unreliable and could not yield an accurate error rate). Similarly, in Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., where 
plaintiffs filed suit against a drug manufacturer after their son committed suicide shortly after taking a 
drug prescribed to treat depression, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling rejecting plaintiff’s 
expert—whose opinion would have provided evidence correlating the suicide and drug consumption. 
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combinations of these questions as well.36 The Court’s language simply 
provides: 
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court 
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, and the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operation.37 
With such minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower court on 
remand found two of the four factors—one being the rate of error—
”difficult or impossible to apply to the expert testimony in th[e] case.”38 
More recently, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, inter 
alia, to reflect the Court’s reasoning in Daubert and its progeny, 
including Joiner and Kumho Tire: 
  If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
 
356 F.3d 1326, 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2004). Concerning the rate of error, the court held that the test 
lacked sufficient sample size, controls, and interaction with study participants to be based on sound 
facts. Id. As a final example, the plaintiff in Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Duboi U.K., Ltd., a 
developer of fanjet engines, sued the defendant, a designer, for breach of contract over a piece of 
engine the defendant designed, which plaintiff claimed was “worthless.” 326 F.3d 1333, 1343–45 (11th 
Cir. 2003). The court found that a defense expert in the field of aerospace engineering, proffered to 
provide support that the piece worked as described, was properly admitted. Id. The court also found 
the error rate to be “relatively low.” Id. Plaintiff argued that the expert had entered data incorrectly, 
but the court held that the mistake would not affect the validity of the evidence. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 427–28, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding 
the decision to admit testimony of a forensic chemist expert, because although she could not identify 
an error rate, reviews of her work found it to be error-free); United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 
144 F.3d 476, 480, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the rate of error was accounted for in the test’s 
control over false positives and false negatives in plaintiffs’ proffered scientific evidence, showing the 
presence of a known carcinogen in defendant’s livestock feed used to reduce fat in animals); United 
States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1444, 1446–48 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that DNA evidence was 
properly admitted, as it was tested, reviewed, and accepted by the scientific community, and in regards 
to the error rate, finding that the test had followed acceptable standards and, therefore, the accuracy 
of the test was statistically significant); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1148, 1152, 1154–55 
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that although the rate of error was not quantified, there was a sufficient 
showing in support of a low error rate to allow expert testimony matching the defendant’s DNA with 
that found on the body of a sexual abuse victim, and noting, specifically, the minimal existence of false 
positives); Wright v. Case Corp., No. 1:03-CV-1618-JEC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *14 (N.D. Ga. 
Feb. 1, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s mechanical engineering expert, 
because the expert’s alternative designs for the seat safety bar were not reliable due to potential 
feasibility issues, and because the associated error rate was therefore unquantifiable but potentially 
very high). 
 37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995). On remand, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s experts, providing opinions that a 
prescription drug taken during pregnancy caused birth defects in infants, were inadmissible, leading to 
a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1322. In applying the Daubert factors, the court 
found that interpretation of the third factor—rate of error—was particularly difficult, primarily 
because two of the three experts did not actually test their theories, making an error rate impossible to 
define. Id. at 1317 n.4. 
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otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case.39 
This second attempt at the complex business of codifying the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to allow opinion testimony suggests at least 
two things: first, that the language of Rule 702 needs to be redrafted to 
use clearer language and to be more consistent with existing authority; 
and second, that the prevailing four factors of Daubert are insufficient for 
guiding determinations of admissibility.40 Nevertheless, the Daubert 
factors continue to assert a powerful force in the admissibility of expert 
evidence. 
II.  Error in the Courts 
In Part II, we empirically review how courts have handled the 
“known or potential rate of error” (“KPRE”) factor41 at trial and on 
appeal. To generally understand how the courts have managed the 
KPRE factor, we collected all federal trial and federal appellate cases 
prior to October 2008 that satisfied the criteria of citing Daubert and, 
specifically, using either the term “error rate” (“ER”) or “known or 
potential rate of error.”42 
A. Trial Court Results 
Our research produced 1585 trial cases with several thousand 
experts. Using stratified random sampling with different circuits as the 
strata, we identified 107 trial cases for our research.43 Taken together, 
these cases provided 200 experts who were challenged for admissibility.44  
 
 
 39. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
 40. See Fed R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 42. The search concluded in October 2008. To develop a dataset of cases from which we could 
draw a sample, we used the LexisNexis online database. Our search was repeated three times per 
circuit: First by a key term search of “known or potential rate of error,” then by a key term search of 
“error rate,” then by both “known or potential rate of error” and “error rate” (to identify any cases 
using both phrases and, therefore, listed twice within the collected results). 
 43. Although stratified sampling ordinarily is designed to balance the sample—in other words, to 
achieve a constant proportion—across each stratum, our method was primarily designed to avoid lack 
of representation in any one of the circuit courts of appeal. See Gary L. Tietjen, A Topical 
Dictionary of Statistics 145 (1986). 
 44. See infra Table 1. 
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Table 1: Trial Cases by Circuits That 
Cite DAUBERT and Refer to ER or KPRE45 
Federal 
Circuit 
Identified 
Stratified 
Random 
Sampling 
1st 58 4 
2d 190 12 
3d 189 12 
4th 68 4 
5th 196 12 
6th 140 9 
7th 172 11 
8th 123 8 
9th 135 8 
10th 150 9 
11th 148 9 
DC 16 9 
Total 1585 107 
 
At the trial court level, we examined several elements, including the 
frequency with which experts were scrutinized46 under each factor and 
the frequency that the expert was admitted.47 For example, only 33 of 200 
randomly selected experts were analyzed on KPRE, and none of those 33 
experts were analyzed on KPRE alone. Not surprisingly, KPRE was the 
factor considered least among the four. Although the random sample 
size is insufficient to identify a significant difference in admit proportions 
among the four factors, KPRE exhibits the second lowest admit 
proportion. This suggests that perhaps it may be a factor of “last” resort 
when trial courts prepare their support for not admitting an expert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45. Note that 107 cases produced 200 experts.  
 46. We required that the factor be applied to the context of the case. If a factor was mentioned 
within a case in regards only to a discussion of Daubert, rather than in application to the case, we 
regarded the factor as unaddressed. 
 47. See infra Table 2. 
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Table 2: Trial Cases Involving the Admissibility of 
Experts Classified by Factor48 
 
KPRE Testability 
Peer Review 
(PR) 
General 
Acceptance 
(GA) 
Total 
Only 
KPRE 
With 
Other 
Factors 
Only 
Test-
ability 
With 
Other 
Factors 
Only 
PR 
With 
Other 
Factors 
Only 
GA  
With 
Other 
Factors 
Number 0 33 82 69 3 44 5 49 200 
Admit 0 16 53 37 2 19 5 26 130 
Admit 
Proportion 
N/A 0.48 0.65 0.54 0.67 0.43 1.00 0.53 0.65 
95% CI for 
Admit  
Proportion 
N/A 
0.31–
0.66 
0.54–
0.75 
0.42–
0.65 
0.10–
1.00 
0.29–
0.58 
0.56–
1.00 
0.39–
0.67 
0.58–
0.72 
 
Not surprisingly, testability is a favored factor, probably because it is 
grounded in principles other than science and can be affirmatively 
demonstrated by simply providing an explanation of how a theory may 
be tested and, by extension, rejected.49 General acceptance requires more 
subjectivity as experts may reasonably disagree as to what is generally 
accepted within their fields. General acceptance also has problems 
standing on its own due to the Court’s setting it aside in Frye as a lone 
factor.50 General acceptance, however, has enjoyed the position of sole 
criterion on admissibility for seventy years,51 and it is not surprising to see 
its prevalence in many of the decisions. Peer review is more difficult to 
assess and thus, less frequently analyzed on its own. This is probably due 
to the fact that adequate peer review falls squarely within the prevailing 
culture of science, a realm which the gatekeeper may avoid in favor of 
more accessible factors. Nevertheless, the data suggest peer review is an 
easier factor to assess than error. 
Also significant in Table 2 is the admissibility frequency: When 
multiple factors are considered, the likelihood of admission decreases in 
all cases. We believe that these data suggest, even if only slightly, that 
trial courts’ presumption is toward admission. When admission is 
rejected, the courts are more careful to provide additional bases. One 
thing is certain: The covariate52 of the factor is essential to the analysis.53 
 
 48. Note that the totals do not add across the rows because of double counting in columns 3, 5, 7, 
and 9. 
 49. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citing Karl Popper, 
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989)). 
 50. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 51. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. 
 52. A covariate is a relevant but often missing variable in an analysis. Judea Pearl, Causality 78 
(2000). In this case, when the specific factor is present in Table 2, the effect is evident. When the effect 
is obscured through aggregation of the data in Table 3, the effect vanishes. A fine example of a missing 
covariate is provided in David H. Kaye & David A Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in 
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When ignoring the covariate of factor, the effect essentially vanishes. 
Note the admit proportion is 64% when ignoring specific factors but 
becomes 48%, 54%, 43%, and 53%, respectively, when considered by 
factor. This is an example of a pseudo-Simpson’s Paradox.54 
Table 3: Trial Cases Involving the Admissibility of Experts 
Classified by Single Factor and Multiple Factors 
 Single 
Factor Only 
Multiple 
Factors 
Total 
Number 90 110 200 
Admit 60 70 130 
Proportion 0.67 0.64 0.65 
 
Concerning the covariate of the factor, we considered whether each 
factor was a significant predictor of admissibility. Using the entire 
random sample of 200 experts, we created a simple two-by-two 
contingency table55 for each factor. One variable was whether the factor 
was considered or not in the decision whether to admit the expert. The 
second variable was whether the expert was admitted or not.56 It is 
evident from the p-values that all factors were associated with the 
decision to admit except for general acceptance, which was not 
statistically significantly linked.57 More specifically, when the statistically 
significant factors were considered, admit proportions dropped. 
Whenever KPRE,58 peer review59 or testability60 were analyzed, apart or 
together, there was a statistically significant drop in the likelihood of 
admission when compared to all other cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 83, 108–10 & n.10 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. Ed., 2d ed. 2000), in 
which the missing covariate is the college attended by the people in the sample.  
 53. See infra Table 3. 
 54. Simpson’s Paradox concerns the contradictory result that occasionally occurs when a 
covariate is missing. Pearl, supra note 52. A fine example of a Simpson’s Paradox is evident within the 
missing covariate example provided in Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 108–10. 
 55. See generally David J. Sheskin, Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical 
Procedures 209–11 (1997) (discussing rXc contingency tables). 
 56. See infra Tables 4, 5, 6, & 7. 
 57. See infra Table 7. 
 58. See infra Table 4. 
 59. See infra Table 5. 
 60. See infra Table 6. 
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Table 4: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by 
Consideration of KPRE61 
 
Court Did 
Consider 
KPRE 
Court Did 
NOT Consider 
KPRE 
Total 
Admit 16 114 130 
NOT Admit 17 53 70 
Total 33 167 200 
Proportion 0.48 0.68 0.65 
Table 5: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by 
Consideration of PR62 
 
Court Did 
Consider 
PR 
Court Did 
NOT Consider 
PR 
Total 
Admit 21 109 130 
NOT Admit 26 44 70 
Total 47 153 200 
Proportion 0.45 0.71 0.65 
Table 6: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by 
Consideration of Testability63 
 
Court Did 
Consider 
Testability 
Court Did 
NOT Consider 
Testability 
Total 
Admit 90 40 130 
NOT Admit 61 9 70 
Total 151 49 200 
Proportion 0.60 0.82 0.65 
Table 7: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by 
Consideration of GA64 
 
Court Did 
Consider 
GA 
Court Did 
NOT Consider 
GA 
Total 
Admit 31 99 130 
NOT Admit 23 47 70 
Total 54 146 200 
Proportion 0.57 0.68 0.65 
 
 
 61. Chi Square = 4.74, p ≈ 0.0295. 
 62. Chi Square = 11.15, p ≈ 0.0008. 
 63. Chi Square = 7.89, p ≈ 0.0050. 
 64. Chi Square = 1.87, p ≈ 0.1710. 
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Taken together, our findings from the randomly selected trial cases 
suggest that trial courts tend to avoid KPRE (and to a lesser degree, peer 
review). Whenever trial courts considered these two factors, they tended 
to use the factors to support their decisions not to admit the expert. 
B. Appellate Court Results 
Applying the same search criteria used to identify trial cases, we 
identified 337 experts considered in 271 appellate cases satisfying our 
search criteria. These data are a complete census of our findings at the 
appellate level, unlike the trial cases in which the large numbers of 
identified cases and experts necessitated sampling.65 At the appellate 
level, we were primarily interested in whether trial decisions were 
reversed or not and whether the appellate court identified KPRE in its 
reasoning. 
Table 8: Experts Identified in Appellate Cases: 
Cases That Refer to ER or KPRE 
Fed 
Circuit 
Experts 
Identified 
Number of Experts 
or Judges that 
Directly Addressed 
ER or KPRE 
Proportion of 
Experts or Judges 
Directly Addressing 
ER or KPRE 
Reversals 
Reversals with 
ER or KPRE 
Addressed in 
the Opinion 
1st 12 3 0.25 1 0 
2d 11 0 0.00 1 0 
3d 19 3 0.16 6 2 
4th 22 3 0.14 0 0 
5th 36 1 0.03 12 0 
6th 32 2 0.06 5 0 
7th 25 2 0.08 7 0 
8th 33 9 0.27 11 3 
9th 52 11 0.21 10 0 
10th 46 2 0.04 4 0 
11th 40 4 0.10 8 0 
DC 9 1 0.11 3 0 
Totals 337 41 0.12 68 5 
 
Evident from Tables 9 and 10 below is the finding that reversals 
drop when ER or KPRE is directly addressed in the lower court. 
Although not persuasive standing alone, it is additional evidence that the 
KPRE factor may be troublesome. When appellate courts review cases 
that directly address the KPRE factor for experts not admitted, the 
reversals drop from 15% to 11% (p = 0.28). Similarly, when appellate 
courts review cases that directly address the KPRE factor for experts 
admitted, the reversals drop from 25% to 14% (p = 0.08). These results, 
taken together, could indicate one of at least two things about the 
appellate courts: (1) they are less comfortable with the substantive issues 
of KPRE and thus more deferential, but nevertheless feel compelled to 
 
 65. See infra Table 8. 
Haug_62-HLJ-221 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011  12:20 PM 
750 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:737 
consider it as a matter of law, or (2) they find that the substantive issues 
of KPRE provide an improved measure of objectivity in the gatekeeper’s 
decision and, accordingly, are more deferential. In either case, these data 
and inferences support the idea that the KPRE factor would benefit from 
a carefully constructed definition that would be easy to implement but 
nevertheless confer objectivity upon the decision to admit expert evidence. 
Table 9: Experts (n = 337) Within Appellate Cases 
That Refer to ER or KPRE66 
 Reversed Proportion 
Reversed 
Admitted 
 N Y  
N 141 25 0.15 
Y 128 43 0.25 
Table 10: Experts (n = 41) Within Appellate Cases: 
Experts or Judges That Directly Address ER or KPRE67 
 Reversed Proportion 
Reversed 
Admitted 
 N Y  
N 17 2 0.11 
Y 19 3 0.14 
C. Summary of Results 
Our empirical analyses confirm our hypothesis: Daubert is difficult 
to implement. More specifically, the nonexclusive factor of KPRE is 
especially problematic. Its prevalence among the four enumerated 
factors is the lowest. In fact, within a relatively large representative 
sample of cases, we never found it to be the sole criterion for 
admissibility. We did, however, find each of the other factors serving as 
sole criterion in a number of cases. Whenever KPRE was applied in 
conjunction with other factors, its application was inconsistent with 
scientists’ concept of error. 
In our analyses of appellate decisions, we found that only 12% of 
the experts or judges in these decisions have directly dealt with KPRE. 
Furthermore, when the appellate court reversed the trial court on the 
admissibility of expert opinion—in 20% of the cases—the appellate court 
relied on KPRE in only 7% of those reversals—the entirety of which (5 
of 68) came from only two circuits. Our scientific training, together with 
these data, leads us to believe that the KPRE factor ought to be the 
essential factor of admissibility. As it is the most problematic, proper 
 
 66. Chi Square = 5.32, p ≈ 0.0211. 
 67. Chi Square = 0.09, p ≈ 0.7615. 
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consideration of this factor demands attention. 
III.  A Taxonomy of Error 
Most people can find some comfort in the quantification of error, if 
for no other reason than that correct quantification provides objectivity. 
Scientists and professionals regularly assert confidence intervals68 and p-
values to make their points.69 There is something satisfying in summarily 
reducing the research into a simple decision rule that requires only 
elementary math to appreciate. Confidence intervals and p-values, 
however, only assess the random error evident in the research.70 Because 
great learning and effort is undertaken by the scientist in creating this 
summary—indeed this is one of the greatest parts of a scientist’s 
training—there is something of an “endowment effect” on the process 
and its findings.71 Researcher and reader alike come to appreciate the 
effort, the learning, and the data, and are eager to engage this scientific 
currency of p-values and confidence intervals to assess a scientific 
endeavor’s value.72 
Data derived from scientific and professional inquiry entails three 
specific types of error. These errors are known by other names, but are 
most conveniently referred to as measurement error, random error, and 
systematic error.73 
Table 11: Types of Uncertainty 
Type of 
Uncertainty 
Synonyms Antonyms Basic Cure in Most Cases 
Measurement 
Error 
Measurement 
Variation, Mistake, 
Fraud 
Precision 
Proper Equipment and 
Proper Procedures Lead to 
Greater Precision 
Random Error 
Variation, Chance, 
Noise 
Reliability, 
Consistency 
Larger Sample Sizes Lead to 
Greater Reliability 
Systematic Error 
Systematic 
Variation, Bias 
Validity, 
Accuracy 
Random Sampling or 
Randomization Enhances 
Validity 
 
 68. Stacie Ezelle Taylor, Confidence Intervals, in 1 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology 225–27 (Sarah 
Boslaugh ed., 2008). 
 69. Mark Gerald Haug, p-Value, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology 863–65 (Sarah Boslaugh 
ed., 2008). 
 70. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 161, 168. 
 71. John R. Nofsinger, The Psychology of Investing 36 (2d ed. 2005). 
 72. The first Author, in his law practice, has witnessed this phenomena—summarily reducing 
KPRE to a question of p-value or confidence interval—among other attorneys and judges in toxic tort 
litigation and class actions, as well as in prominent Continuing Legal Education (CLE) venues. 
 73. See Rebecca Harrington & Li-Ching Lee, Type I and Type II Errors, in 2 Encyclopedia of 
Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 1052, 1052–53; David L. McArthur, Measurement, in 2 Encyclopedia 
of Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 645, 645; Louise-Anne McNutt et al., Bias, in 1 Encyclopedia of 
Epidemiology, supra note 68, at 77, 77. 
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A. Measurement Error 
Measurement error concerns the uncertainty in measuring a fixed 
quantity.74 To measure a mile is a trivial task—a fixed quantity measured 
out with whatever tool is handy. Note, though, that the tool may not be 
perfectly measured out to exactly one mile. Also, the operator measuring 
the mile may err in application of the tool.75 In a scientific endeavor 
where the stakes may be sufficiently high—unlike the mile measurement 
above—these potential measurement errors are controlled with sufficient 
care relative to the theory studied and its implications.76 
B. Random Error 
Random error concerns chance: the reality that uncertainty exists 
due to matters beyond our perception.77 For example, the stock market 
exhibits random error—if it did not, the efficient market naysayers would 
seize upon every change and become extraordinarily wealthy. A more 
mundane and illustrative example is the simple die. Its sole purpose is to 
introduce random variation. Random error occurs when we reasonably 
expect the “expected value” of 3.5, but never actually observe such a 
value.78 More relevant to legal practice, random error is contemplated in 
employment law’s theory of disparate impact,79 where a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case may be made on a p-value of around 0.05.80 The p-value is 
nothing more than a statement of random error. 
C. Systematic Error 
We believe that an expert’s account of systematic error is far more 
important than that of random error. While both are important, 
systematic error goes to the question of relevance: to what degree does 
the research generalize to the person(s) in question?81 Random error 
merely is an artifact of research protocol—namely, sample size: given 
 
 74. See McArthur, supra note 73, at 645–49. 
 75. Each of these concerns may be considered as sub-units of measurement error. Many scientific 
disciplines have their own nomenclature, but in the end, these ideas are collectively measurement 
error. 
 76. See Mark Haug & Mark Hirschey, The January Effect, 62 Fin. Analysts J., Sept./Oct. 2006, at 
78, 79 (arguing that by examining small-cap stocks instead of more profitable trading opportunities, 
the effect being studied is more likely a statistical oddity than compelling evidence of market 
inefficiency). 
 77. See Harrington & Lee, supra note 73, at 1053 (“[W]e accept the probability of drawing 
incorrect conclusions merely by chance.”). 
 78. See generally Deborah J. Bennett, Randomness (1998). 
 79. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (considering statistical evidence 
of employment discrimination). 
 80. 1 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert 
Testimony § 6:36, at 360 n.3, 362 (2008–2009 ed. 2008).  
 81. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 160. 
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that to which we can generalize, to what degree is the picture in focus?82 
We believe it unfortunate that footnote 9 ever found its way into 
Daubert—as Starrs’s point cited therein is incorrect.83 Scientific reliability 
is a question of random error, while scientific validity is a question of 
systematic error.84 
Systematic error, more commonly known as bias, is a great fact of 
the scientific endeavor.85 A large volume of litigation involves human 
injury such as toxic torts, medical malpractice, and products liability. In 
such matters, proximate cause is typically established with scientific 
evidence demonstrating an association between the action complained of 
and the plaintiff’s injury or damages.86 Unfortunately, such scientific 
findings of association often do not enjoy the benefits of an experimental 
protocol, but rather an observational protocol.87 For example, animal 
studies are extremely useful in elevating human subject research from 
observational to experimental—permitting random sampling and its 
accompanying benefits.88 Criticism, however, often draws attention to the 
differences between the animal and the human—the sole source of bias 
in a well-designed animal study—while largely ignoring the many biases 
attendant to the alternative.89 
The distinction between experimental (elements of random 
sampling90 or randomization91) and observational (no random 
 
 82. See generally Bennett, supra note 78. 
 83. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (“[T]he difference between 
accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a 
hen’s kick.” (quoting James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal 
to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986))). 
 84. See McArthur, supra note 73. 
 85. See McNutt et al., supra note 73. 
 86. See Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference Manual on 
Scientific Evidence, supra note 52, at 333, 374 (“Once an association has been found between 
exposure to an agent and development of a disease, researchers consider whether the association 
reflects a true cause-effect relationship.”). 
 87. An experimental protocol contains some element of random sampling or randomization that 
eliminates experimental bias beyond the point of the randomizing/random sampling. Id. at 391. For 
example, clinical trials enjoy the benefits of an experimental protocol. See John J. Hsieh, Clinical 
Trials, in 1 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 201–02. An observational protocol has 
no element of either randomization or random sampling. Green et al., supra note 86, at 394. 
Accordingly, scientists must thoroughly consider their research designs to minimize biases to the 
extent possible. See Craig Newschaffer, Observational Studies, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, 
supra note 69, at 757–60. 
 88. Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra note 52, at 405. 
 89.  Id. at 413–14. David Sackett has catalogued thirty-five biases that may accompany the sort of 
scientific studies that would be appropriate in the absence of animal studies. See generally David L. 
Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32 J. Chronic Diseases 51 (1979). 
 90. See Anthony Roman, Sampling Techniques, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 
69, at 935–38. 
 91. See Sydney Pettygrove, Randomization, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 69, 
at 891. 
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component) derives from the same features that systematic error does. 
For example, a toxicology study may use humans as it subjects. Of 
course, there ought to be no random component—as that would 
inevitably place someone in harm’s way against his wishes. Using an 
observational study, for instance, a cohort study,92 we could track people 
over time and study the relationship between those who were exposed to 
the suspected agent and the suspected outcome(s). If a relationship 
exists, we are wary of the relationship, as there may be other factors not 
studied that are the true causes of the outcome.93 Random sampling and 
randomization solves this problem by creating statistically equivalent 
groups.94 Therefore, a scientist may prefer rats as subjects. When all is 
said and done, rat studies enjoy the benefits and expediency of 
experimental studies. Of course, there now remains a new source of 
systematic bias: Rats are systematically different than humans. A proper 
scientific analysis of either protocol would identify and enumerate the 
sources of systematic error. 
Conclusion 
The idea of error summarily captures the whole of an expert’s 
credibility. If evidence is without error, then we welcome it, except where 
it may be unjust to do so. If evidence is with error—and that error can be 
properly accounted for—then we would also welcome it as evidence, 
except where it may be unjust to do so, as it would “assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”95 Our 
proposal is aimed toward this end:  
If an expert can account for the measurement error, the random error, 
and the systematic error in his evidence, then he ought to be permitted 
to testify. On the other hand, if he should fail to account for any one or 
more of these three types of error, then his testimony ought not be 
admitted.  
Our proposal satisfies all four criteria outlined in Daubert, is more 
expedient than Daubert or Federal Rule of Evidence 702, is more 
manageable to the gatekeeper, and will result in better decisions through 
its reliance on objectivity. Where there is disagreement as to its elements, 
“vigorous cross-examination” ensures better decisions. 
Certainly an accounting of error more fully responds to KPRE than 
does any other alternative—which usually entails an analysis of the 
 
 92. See Philip C. Nasca, Study Design, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 
1008, 1010–11. 
 93. See Green, supra note 86, at 369 (“Even when an association exists, researchers must 
determine whether the exposure causes the disease or whether the exposure and disease are caused by 
some other confounding factor.”). 
 94. See supra notes 90 and 91. 
 95. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
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“inferior” random error.96 A full accounting of error also satisfies 
testability, as such an accounting can only be derived from empirical 
evidence. To have empirical evidence is to have testability, as testing is 
the source of empirical evidence. Peer review and general acceptance 
find their way into the “Daubert calculus” through judicial deference 
towards the expert’s profession: “What do other experts in this field 
make of this evidence?” 
Nearly every scientist’s academic training includes coursework in 
statistics either in name or through other coursework concerning 
research methodology. What all these courses have in common is a 
thorough treatment of random error. Often in the social sciences, they 
include a thorough treatment of measurement error and in all the 
sciences, admonishment to minimize measurement error and systematic 
error to the extent possible in any given research. Unquestionably, peer 
review and general acceptance, within any scientific discipline, rest 
squarely on this cornerstone of science. 
Our proposal is also more expedient than Daubert or Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702. Daubert’s four nonexclusive factors and requirement of 
“relevance” constitute an important attempt to achieve just resolutions in 
litigation. Similarly, amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702’s three 
criteria are “codified” positions to build upon Daubert’s standard for 
admissibility. Each attempt seeks to insure that scientific evidence be 
admitted when it is objective and untethered to advocacy, and excluded 
when it is not. We propose an abandonment of these positions and 
encourage the courts to deal with the interest squarely: to nail down 
objectivity directly at its enabling source: the accounting of error. 
When an expert is required to account for error, litigation is much 
more manageable to the gatekeeper. So-called “Daubert hearings” 
properly place the burden of admissibility on the litigants.97 Current 
hearings, which often consist of confusing arguments—one side 
borrowing some elements, while the other side borrowing other 
elements—easily become contests of covert obfuscation (resembling 
what every parent of two or more children knows all too well), entreating 
the gatekeeper cum parent. Our proposal, on the other hand, anchors the 
hearings squarely on three definitive criteria, all of which must be 
addressed. There is nothing more or anything less for the judge to 
 
 96. Random error is inferior to systematic error by virtue of its origin. Random error derives 
from sample size—smaller sample sizes yield more random error—and alternatively, larger samples 
convey consistency (scientific reliability). Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 171. Random error says 
nothing as to whether the results are “on point”—the “fit” of the evidence to the case at bar. 
Systematic error, on the other hand, derives from lack of fit between the “inequality” of the evidence 
and the case at bar—ordinarily sampling that is not random. In animal studies, however, the source of 
systematic error stems from the differences between the animal and the human. Id. at 160. 
 97. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987). 
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consider. Can the expert account for the three errors? Can the opponent 
adequately dispute the accounting? At a properly adversarial hearing, 
such directed purpose and clear rules will assist nearly any jurist in 
determining whether the proposed expert can adequately account for 
error. Such a hearing would free the judge of having to rely on notions or 
presumptions to distinguish science from mere “junk science.”98 
Moreover, our proposal will result in better decisions through its 
reliance on objectivity. The admissibility of expert evidence historically 
has been difficult to address properly99 due to its high impact on 
outcomes in litigation, as well as the high potential for courts to decide 
admissibility inconsistently. It is precisely because expert evidence has 
such a great influence on outcomes, and rightfully so where experts can 
cast clarifying light on a matter, that we ought to desire consistent 
application of the rules of admissibility. By writing the rules around the 
three sources of error, we achieve the interest of objectivity, we obtain 
consistency in the application of the rules, and we maintain deference to 
the scientific endeavor. These three outcomes, taken together, will result 
in better decisions, and ultimately the justice100 that they serve. 
 
 
 98. See Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and 
the Federal Courts 16–17 (1999). 
 99. See Golan, supra note 16, at 5–7. 
 100. “Justice” is an unfortunate victim of the inevitable clutter of language amidst life and conflict. 
Contemporary usage has relegated “justice” to merely an act of the will, or less, an act of emotion, 
rather than to its ancient place as the second of the four cardinal virtues. See generally Josef Pieper, 
The Four Cardinal Virtues (1966). It is in the spirit of the cardinal virtues, namely, the cardinal 
virtue of prudence (an even more tortured victim of contemporary usage) and of justice, that 
motivates our proposal. See generally id. 
